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The Capital Markets Perspective on a
National Securities Regulator
Poonam Puri*

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last four decades, successive federal governments (and at
least one provincial government) have constituted panels, commissioned
studies, and drafted legislation intended to lead to the creation of a national securities regulator for Canada. These attempts can be traced back
at least as far as the 1979 Proposals for a Securities Market Law for
Canada,1 to more recent attempts including the 2003 Wise Persons’
Committee2 (“WPC”), and the most recent 2009 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation (“Hockin Panel”).3
Following the release of the Hockin Panel Report, the federal government created the Canadian Securities Transition Office (“CSTO”) in
July 2009 to effectively transition to a Canadian securities regulator.4 The
CSTO was given the mandate to (i) develop a draft Securities Act for the
approval of the Minister of Finance; (ii) create a Transition Plan which
would act as a roadmap for establishing a Canadian securities regulator
and integrating the regulators of the participating jurisdictions into a new
agency with a common organizational structure; and (iii) consult with the
*
Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Co-Director,
Hennick Centre for Business and Law, York University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at 2009 Constitutional Cases: The Thirteenth Annual Analysis of the Constitutional Decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada (April 16, 2010). Stephanie Kam, Sheetal Nanda, Sylvia
Schumacher and Matt Segal provided excellent research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1
Philip Anisman et al., Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada, vol. 3 (Ottawa:
Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1979).
2
Wise Persons’ Committee, It’s Time (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2003),
online: Wise Persons’ Committee <http://www.wise-averties.ca/reports/WPC Final.pdf> [hereinafter
“WPC”].
3
Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating an Advantage in Global Capital Markets:
Final Report and Recommendations (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2009) [hereinafter
“Hockin Panel Report”], online: Expert Panel on Securities Regulation <http://www.expertpanel.ca/
eng/documents/Expert_Panel_Final_Report_And_Recommendations.pdf>.
4
For more details on the creation of the CSTO, see online: Canadian Securities Transition
Office <http://www.csto.ca/en/about-csto.aspx>.
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Advisory Committee of Participating Provinces and Territories as well as
other capital markets stakeholders on the draft Securities Act and the
Transition Plan.
On May 26, 2010, the federal Department of Finance released the proposed Canadian Securities Act.5 On the same day, the proposed legislation
was referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for a determination of the
Parliament of Canada’s legislative authority to enact such legislation. Quebec and Alberta had previously launched constitutional challenges in their
respective provincial courts, based on the draft legislation that accompanied the Hockin Panel Report.
In July 2010, the CSTO released the Transition Plan, which addresses governance, organizational and administrative matters in relation
to the proposed securities regulator.6 The Transition Plan will have to be
approved by all of the participating provinces and territories and the
CSTO is currently negotiating with the willing jurisdictions. The Canadian government has allocated $150 million to address financial issues as
a part of the negotiation that will move Canada from provincial/territorial
regulation to a single national regulator. The Transition Plan indicates
that the Canadian securities regulator should be up and running by late
2012 or early 2013.7
It is expected that the Supreme Court of Canada will hear the case in
late 2010 or early 2011. The Transition Plan assumes that the Supreme
Court will rule in favour of the Parliament of Canada having the constitutional authority to enact the proposed Canadian Securities Act. The
specific constitutional issue is whether a federally enacted securities act
encroaches on provincial authority to regulate the securities market under
“property and civil rights”, or whether the Parliament of Canada has the
authority to regulate capital markets under its federal “trade and commerce” power. The heavyweights of Canadian constitutional law have
opined that there is a valid federal power under the Constitution to regulate the Canadian securities market.8

5
Proposed Canadian Securities Act, online: Department of Finance Canada <http://www.
fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/csa-lvm-eng.htm>.
6
Canadian Securities Transition Office, Transition Plan for the Canadian Securities Regulatory Authority, (2010), online: Canadian Securities Transition Office <http://www.csto.ca/
documents/Transition_Plan_for_the_CSRA .pdf>.
7
Id., at 7.
8
See, e.g., the three Constitutional Opinions provided to the WPC in relation to the model proposed by the WPC, online: Wise Persons’ Committee <http://www.wise-averties.ca/report_en.html>.
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In his paper entitled “‘Please, Draw Me a Field of Jurisdiction’:
Regulating Securities, Securing Federalism”,9 Professor Jean Leclair
concludes that the Supreme Court of Canada will likely rule in favour of
Parliament having the constitutional authority to regulate the securities
market in Canada. He very reasonably argues that if the Supreme Court
is to grant this power to Parliament, then its decision and reasoning
should be based on empirical facts.10
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical foundation from
a capital markets perspective to ground the discussion and analysis on
the constitutionality of a national securities regulator. Based on the data,
the case for a national securities regulator for Canada is more evident
now than it has ever been.
This paper first explores the academic and empirical literature on the
relationship between regulation and the strength of that jurisdiction’s
capital markets, as measured by the cost of capital, liquidity and investor
protection. Studies have found that Canadian companies have a higher
cost of capital than their U.S. counterparts, even after accounting for
risk,11 meaning that Canadian companies pay more financing than their
peers. Canadian companies also receive lower valuations. This, in part,
can be attributed to the limitations associated with our fragmented regulatory structure, as well as concerns about weak enforcement.
The paper then explores the data on Canadian retail and institutional
investors and their investing patterns, as well as the financing needs and
preferences of Canadian businesses. The data show that the capital markets are now more important than ever to Canadian investors and
businesses alike. Capital markets have become a preferred vehicle for
investing the savings of individual Canadians, as compared to other investment opportunities. Similarly, institutional investors such as pension
funds invest a significant proportion of their assets in the public capital
9
Jean Leclair, “‘Please, Draw Me a Field of Jurisdiction’: Regulating Securities, Securing
Federalism”, in this volume.
10
Id.
11
Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, “International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do
Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?” (2006) 44:3 Journal of Accounting Research 485
[hereinafter “Hail & Leuz”], where the authors observed that the cost of equity capital is 25 basis points
higher in Canada than in the United States. See also Michael King & Dan Segal, “Valuation of Canadian- vs. U.S.-Listed Equity: Is there a Discount?” (2003) Bank of Canada Working Paper 2003-6
[hereinafter “King & Segal”], which came to the conclusion that Canadian public companies are valued
significantly lower than those in the United States while attempting to control for a number of variables;
Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, Canada Steps Up: Final Report (Toronto:
Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 2006), at 24 [hereinafter “Allen Report”],
online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada <http://www.tfmsl.ca>.

606

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

markets. In terms of financing growth and expansion for Canadian businesses, capital markets play a more dominant role than they have ever
done in the recent past.
Finally, the paper explores how changes in the regulatory and global
capital markets environment further exacerbate the negative impact of
Canada’s fragmented regulatory system and highlight the need for national regulation.
This paper proceeds as follows: Part II reviews the academic and
empirical literature on the relationship between regulation and regulatory
structure and the strength of capital markets. Part III examines the data
on the changing needs and preferences of Canadian investors and businesses. Part IV highlights the changes in the regulatory environment and
global capital markets that would have an impact on the discussion of the
necessity of federal versus provincial/territorial regulation of capital
markets. Part V concludes.

II. THE ROLE OF REGULATION OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS
This part of the paper first explores the policy rationales underlying
capital markets regulation and explains how high investor confidence in
a jurisdiction’s capital market helps to increase liquidity in that market
and decrease the cost of capital that businesses in that jurisdiction must
pay. This part then reviews the academic literature on the relationship
between strong regulation and the development of capital markets. It
finds that academic studies show that Canadian companies suffer from a
“Canadian discount” in that they pay more for capital than their U.S.
counterparts. Canadian companies also suffer from lower valuations.
This can be attributed, in part, to our inefficient securities regulatory
framework with 13 provincial regulators as well as concerns about ineffective enforcement.
1. Fundamental Principles of Capital Markets Regulation
The purposes of capital markets regulation are often stated as: 12
•

promoting fair and efficient capital markets;

•

protecting investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices;
and
12

See, e.g., Ontario’s Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 1.1.
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maintaining public/investor confidence in the capital markets.

In an efficient capital market, the price of stocks reflects all relevant
information that is available about their intrinsic or true value.13 A stock
represents a claim on future cash flows, and thus the intrinsic value is the
present value of the cash flows the owner of the security expects to receive. If stock prices accurately reflect all information, new investment
by capital goes to its highest-valued and best use.
Investor confidence in the capital markets impacts liquidity and cost
of capital for businesses. Liquidity relates to the volume of outstanding
shares that are freely trading and refers to the concept of buying or selling shares in the capital markets without causing a significant movement
in the price.14 Having many buyers and sellers trading shares in the capital markets assists in achieving liquidity.
The cost of capital is the price that businesses must pay to access investors’ money.15 If investors lose confidence in the market, they are less
likely to invest in the market, resulting in reduced liquidity. If investors
continue to invest in the market, they are likely to demand high returns
for their investments, resulting in a higher cost of capital for businesses
that want to access public capital. If businesses cannot raise money from
outside investors, they will not be able to invest in profitable projects.
This decreases growth, employment and wealth-creation.16
Capital markets regulation in Canada governs the capital-raising
process for businesses. It also regulates intermediaries in the capital markets, such as underwriters who assist issuers in accessing the market and

13
Richard Brealey & Stewart Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance (New York: Irwin
McGraw Hill, 2006), at 351-77. For detailed discussions of efficient markets theory, see Eugene
Fama, “The Behavior of Stock Market Prices” (1965) 38:1 Journal of Business 34; Eugene Fama,
“Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work” (1970) 25:2 Journal of Finance 383; Eugene Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets II” (1991) 46:5 Journal of Finance 1575;
Burton Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street, 9th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2007).
14
Utpal Bhattacharya, “Enforcement and its Impact on Cost of Equity and Liquidity of the
Market” in Canada Steps Up: Final Report, vol. 6 (Toronto: Task Force to Modernize Securities
Legislation in Canada, 2006) 131, at 144.
15
Id., at 138.
16
Id., at 137. Bhattacharya states:
If securities laws are not enforced, outside investors will doubt whether they will get their
money back with a fair return. So outside investors will not give their money to firms
(this leads to low liquidity in capital markets) or, if they give money to firms, they will
demand a higher return (this leads to a higher cost of equity). If firms cannot raise money
from outside investors, they will not be able to invest in profitable projects. This decreases growth, employment, and wealth-creation.
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brokers, advisors and mutual fund salespeople who assist investors in
investing their savings in the capital markets.
Capital markets regulation requires disclosure of information by issuers so as to enhance the efficiency of the market by allowing stock
prices to reflect publicly available information. It also mandates disclosure of information so that investors can make informed investment
decisions, resulting in higher investor confidence. Capital markets regulation also provides for public and private enforcement remedies if there
is non-compliance with the disclosure regime to ensure a high level of
investor protection.
Capital markets regulation requires market intermediaries such as
brokers and salespeople to be licensed and registered in order to protect
the investing public by ensuring that the investors do not entrust their
money to unscrupulous or incompetent financial services providers,
again to ensure a high level of investor confidence.
Currently, the 13 provincial/territorial securities commissions regulate the capital markets to promote efficiency, investor protection and
investor confidence. If the 13 provincial/territorial securities commissions are regulated well, investors will likely keep their money in or
bring their money to Canada and not take it elsewhere. In addition to the
13 provincial/territorial securities commissions, the self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) such as the Investment Industry Regulatory
Organization of Canada (“IIROC”) and the Mutual Fund Dealers’ Association (“MFDA”) also play a role in regulating some aspects of the
Canadian capital markets.17
2. Positive Correlation between Strong Capital Markets Regulation
and Capital Markets Development
Many academic studies indicate that the quality and strength of capital markets regulation in a country has a positive relationship with the
capital markets development in that country. The quality of a country’s
17
See IIROC website for further details of its mandate, online: IIROC <http://www.iiroc.ca/
english/about/pages/default.aspx>. IIROC was created in 2008 through the consolidation of the
Investment Dealers Association of Canada (“IDA”) and Market Regulation Services Inc. (“RS”). It
is the national SRO that oversees all investment dealers and trading activity on debt and equity marketplaces in Canada. It carries out its regulatory responsibilities through setting and enforcing rules
regarding the proficiency, business and financial conduct of dealer firms and their registered employees, and through setting and enforcing market integrity rules regarding trading activity on
Canadian equity marketplaces. See MFDA website for details of its mandate, online: MFDA
<http://www.mfda.ca/about/aboutMFDA.html>.
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regulation (including disclosure requirements, governance requirements
and actual enforcement) can also have a positive effect on efficient pricing, liquidity and cost of capital for businesses.18
Some studies have found that stricter and better enforced securities
regulation is positively associated with development of the capital market, including the size of a country’s equity capital market and level of
initial public offerings.19 While this study focused on the value of private
enforcement, other studies conclude that public enforcement is at least as
important as private enforcement in the development of stock markets.20
Other studies have analyzed international differences in firms’ cost of
equity capital across 40 countries and found that firms from countries
with more extensive mandated disclosure requirements, stronger securities regulation and stricter enforcement mechanisms have a significantly
lower cost of capital.21 Similarly, another study found that improvements
in the capital market governance index (including degree of earnings
opacity, enforcement of insider trading laws and removal of short selling
restrictions) are associated with decreases in the cost of equity, increases
in market liquidity and increases in market-pricing efficiency.22
Recent scholarship has also found that there is a relationship between
countries’ institutional features and outcomes such as accounting quality,
corporate transparency and firms’ cost of capital. For example, a study by
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki shows that a country’s legal environment (including the strength of its investor protection laws and the enforcement
of those laws) directly impacts firms’ incentives to comply with financial

18
Christopher Nicholls, “The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital Markets and Illustrative
Case of Canada’s Legislative Response to Sarbanes-Oxley” [hereinafter “Nicholls”] in Canada Steps
Up: Final Report, vol. 6 (Toronto: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 2006)
127; Bernard Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets”
(2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
“What Works in Securities Law?” (2006) 61:1 Journal of Finance 1.
19
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, id.
20
Howell Jackson & Mark Roe, “Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence” (2009) 93:2 Journal of Financial Economics 207.
21
Hail & Leuz, supra, note 11. See also Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer & Annette VissingJorgesen, “Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments” (2005)
121:2 Quarterly Journal of Economics 399; Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, “Investor Protection and Equity Markets” (2002) 66:1 Journal of Financial Economics 3; Allan Ferrell, “If We
Understand the Mechanisms, Why Don’t We Understand the Output?” (2003) 28 J. Corp. L. 503.
22
Hazem Daouk, Charles Lee & David Ng, “Capital Market Governance: How Do Security
Laws Affect Market Performance?” (2006) 12:12 Journal of Corporate Finance 560.
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reporting rules and provide high quality financial reports to outside investors.23
Similarly, Ball, Kothari and Robin examine the influence of financial
reporting standards as well as other economic factors on the reporting
decisions of firms in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.24
The authors find that even in those countries that have high quality accounting standards that may parallel those of the U.S. and International
Accounting Standards, other institutional and enforcement factors limit
the effectiveness of the accounting standards, which ultimately leads to
lower quality financial reporting by firms in these countries.25
Some recent studies show that foreign investors invest more in countries with better disclosure regulations. Leuz, Lins and Warnock found
that firms with governance problems attract significantly less foreign
investment and the association between governance and investment by
foreign U.S. investors is most pronounced in countries with overall governance weaknesses and weak disclosure requirements.26
3. The Canadian Discount
Studies show that Canadian public companies pay investors more for
using their capital than companies in the U.S. and that Canadian companies are valued lower than their U.S. counterparts. Leuz and Hail found
that the cost of equity capital is 25 basis points higher in Canada than in
the United States.27 Another study by King and Segal concluded that
Canadian public companies are valued significantly lower than those in
the United States while attempting to control for a number of variables.28
23
Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda & Peter Wysocki, “Earnings Management and Investor
Protection: An International Comparison” (2003) 69:3 Journal of Financial Economics 505.
24
Ray Ball, S.P. Kothari & Ashok Robin, “The Effect of International Institutional Factors
on Properties of Accounting Earnings” (2000) 29:1 Journal of Accounting and Economics 1.
25
See also Raphael La Porta, et al., “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance” (2002)
57:3 Journal of Finance 1147; Stijn Claessens, et al., “The Benefits and Costs of Internal Markets:
Evidence From Asia’s Financial Crisis” (2001) CEI Working Paper Series 2001-15; In-Mu Haw et
al., “Ultimate Ownership, Income Management, and Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions” (2004) 42:2
Journal of Accounting Research 423; Ray Ball & Lakshmanan Shivakumar, “Earnings Quality in
UK Private Firms: Comparative Loss Recognition Timeliness” (2005) 39:1 Journal of Accounting
and Economics 83; David Burgstahler & Michael Eames, “Management of Earnings and Analysts’
Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises” (2006) 33:5-6 Journal of Business
Finance & Accounting 633.
26
Christian Leuz, Karl Linz & Francis Warnock, “Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly
Governed Firms?” (2009) 22:8 Review of Financial Studies 3245.
27
Hail & Leuz, supra, note 11.
28
King & Segal, supra, note 11.

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE CAPITAL MARKETS PERSPECTIVE

611

As such, Canadian public companies must be content with this “Canadian discount” which puts them at a disadvantage internationally vis-àvis other firms seeking capital and investors. The lower valuations of
Canadian companies and the higher cost of capital that our companies
must pay can, in part, be attributed to our inefficient securities regulatory
framework with 13 provincial regulators as well as perceptions and concerns about ineffective enforcement.29

III. THE CHANGING FACE OF INVESTORS AND ISSUERS
This part of the paper discusses some changes that have taken place in
both Canadian and international capital markets with respect to investors
and issuers. The data show that both Canadian investors and Canadian
businesses rely more heavily on capital markets for their savings and financing needs, respectively. As well, in light of the globalization of capital
markets, both investors and issuers have more choice about where they
invest and where they seek capital, respectively. As such, Canada needs to
mobilize its regulatory structure to respond to globalization if it wants to
remain competitive in retaining and attracting investors and issuers.
1. Increasing Importance of Capital Markets to Investors
The capital markets matter to investors, whether they are Canadian
or foreign, retail or institutional. The data show that the Canadian capital
markets have become increasingly important to Canadians for savings. In
the early 1960s an estimated 44 per cent of annual personal savings were
put into life insurance as a wealth-building vehicle; by the 1990s this had
dropped to 22 per cent, in favour of other alternatives, such as mutual
funds and pension funds.30 As of 2003, almost one-half of all Canadians
owned publicly traded equities, either directly or indirectly through mutual funds, double the amount in 1990.31

29
Paul Halpern & Poonam Puri, “Reflections on the Recommendations of the Task Force to
Modernize Securities Regulation in Canada: A Retail Investor Perspective” (2008) 46:2 Can. Bus.
L.J. 199. See also Gordon Boissonneault, “The Relationship between Financial Markets and Economic Growth: Implications for Canada” [hereinafter “Boissonneault”] in A. Douglas Harris, ed.,
It’s Time: Research Studies (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2003).
30
Tarek Harchaoui, Two Decades of Financial Intermediation by the Canadian Insurance
Business (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, April 1997), at 2, online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.
gc.c/pub/63f0002x/63f0002x1997011-eng.pdf>.
31
WPC, supra, note 2, at 6, citing TSX Group, Canadian Shareowners Study (2003).
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If pension fund holdings are included, then almost all Canadians participate in the equity markets.32 For example, the Canada Pension Plan
(“CPP”) holds 55 per cent of its portfolio in public equities.33 More generally, the data show that stocks traded in the public capital markets
account for about 40 per cent of Canadian pension funds asset portfolio.34 This percentage has been stable between 1993 and 2006.
However, foreign holdings by pension funds have more than doubled
to 30 per cent, while holdings of Canadian securities have correspondingly fallen.35 Moreover, in recent years, Canadian capital markets seem
to have experienced difficulty attracting foreign investors, as growing
foreign holdings of Canadian stocks have not kept pace with Canadian
holdings of foreign stock.36 Considering Canada’s strong economic performance, some commentators hypothesize that this disparity may be due
to inefficiencies in the regulation of Canadian capital markets, which
ends up taxing capital market transactions in Canada.37
2. Increasing Importance of Capital Markets to Canadian
Businesses
The data also show that Canada’s capital markets have been playing
an increasingly important role in funding the growth of Canadian businesses. Chart 1 shows that from the early 1960s through the mid-1990s
Canadian corporations sourced funding predominantly through loans and
borrowing, while the next decade saw a dramatic increase in the relative
importance of share issuances. The public equity markets accounted for
over one-half of corporate fundraising in 2000-2005.38 A similar upward
trend can be observed in respect of long-term financing: in 1990, the
capital markets provided 73 per cent of long-term financing of Canadian
firms; by 2002, this had grown to 88 per cent.39
32

WPC, id., at 6.
CPP Investment Board 2010 Annual Report at 17, online: CPP Investment Board
<http://www.cppib.ca/files/PDF/CPPIB_AR_2010_EN_Online.pdf >.
34
Poonam Puri & Palladam Vasudev, “Canadian Pension Funds: Investments and Role in
the Capital Markets and Corporate Governance” (2010) 25:2 B.F.L.R. 247, at 251.
35
Id., at 259.
36
Boissonneault, supra, note 29, at 58.
37
Id., citing Charles Freedman & Walter Engert, “Financial Developments in Canada: Past
Trends and Future Challenges” (Summer 2003) Bank of Canada Review 3.
38
Allan Tomas, Recent Trends in Corporate Finance: Some Evidence form the Canadian
System of National Accounts (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2006), at 9 [hereinafter “Tomas”], online:
Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/13-604-m/13-604-m2006050-eng.pdf>.
39
WPC, supra, note 2, at 4, citing Bank of Canada.
33
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It is also important to note that most businesses that access public
capital in Canada do not do so locally, but rather nationally. Approximately two-thirds of all reporting issuers in Canada are reporting issuers
in more than one province/territory.40 Approximately 30 per cent of the
issuers listed on the TSX and the TSX Venture Exchange are “national
issuers” reporting in all 10 provincial jurisdictions.41
Although a full two-thirds of Canadian issuers report in more than
one province, the Canadian capital market does segment by region based
on different concentrations of industry and expertise. Oil and natural gas
companies, for example, tend to be headquartered in Alberta, financial
services in Toronto and mining small cap in British Columbia.42
However, the location of a company’s headquarters often bears little
relationship to the economic impact of the company’s activities. Financial services, for example, are frequently headquartered in Ontario, but
they account for between 12 per cent and 23 per cent of the GDP of other
provinces.43 Similarly, oil and gas companies may be headquartered in
Alberta but their exploration activities extend from Newfoundland and
Labrador to Iqaluit. In a very real sense, then, such companies are national and indeed international in scope and should be subject to
consistent national regulation rather than a checkerboard of provincial
and territorial rules. To the extent that regulatory expertise has developed
in the provinces and territories where, for instance, oil and gas or financial services are regulated, that regulatory expertise should be harnessed
in the new single regulator.

40

Id., at 5.
Id.
42
Poonam Puri, “Local and Regional Interests in the Debate on Optimal Securities Regulatory Structure” (2004) for the WPC, at 214.
43
Id., at 215.
41
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Chart 1: Share Issuance Overtakes Borrowing in Importance44
%

3. Greater Global Competition and Cross-Listings on the Rise
Canadian businesses are increasingly accessing foreign capital markets, as evidenced by the data on cross-listings of Canadian firms abroad.
The significant use of U.S. capital markets in particular by Canadian
firms suggests that access to global sources of capital is also important
for Canadian firms.
Canadian capital markets are small by global standards. With a market capitalization of US$1,033,448.50 in December 2008, the TSX
Group accounted for 3.2 per cent of global market capitalization, and
ranked eighth among the world’s 10 largest equity exchanges.45
44

Tomas, supra, note 38.
World Federation of Exchanges, 2008 Domestic Market Capitalization, World Federation
of Exchanges, online: <http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2008/equity-markets/
domestic-market-capitalization-0> [hereinafter “WFE”]. The 10 largest, in descending order are:
NYSE Euronext, Tokyo SE Group, NYSE Euronext (Europe), NASDAQ OMX, London SE, Shang45
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The small size of Canadian capital markets implies that when Canadian issuers find the Canadian capital market insufficient to meet their
capital needs, they cross-list on foreign exchanges in an effort to attract
more investors.46 Cross-listing in another jurisdiction has generally benefitted Canadian firms by lowering their cost of capital and increasing
their valuation while simultaneously increasing their share turnover and
their visibility.47
As of March 2006, 48 Canadian companies were listed on the London Stock Exchange.48 As of March 2010, 178 Canadian companies
(approximately 12 per cent) were cross-listed in New York.49 Other Canadian issuers are cross-listed elsewhere in Europe or Australia.
Canadian issuers are particularly well represented on London’s Alternative Investment Market (“AIM”), where approximately 20 per cent
of foreign issuers on AIM are Canadian issuers.50 AIM has been quite
active in attracting foreign listings, growing from three in 1995 to 157 in
June 2005.51 Two-thirds of AIM’s foreign issuers listed between January
2004 and June 2005.52
New York is the most popular market in which Canadian firms crosslist. Of the 178 Canadian firms cross-listed in New York in March 2010,
38 were listed on NASDAQ, 75 on NYSE, and 65 on NYSE Alternext.53
In December 2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission reported that 40 per cent of the foreign firms registered and reporting with
them were Canadian, over four times as many firms as the next-most represented jurisdiction.54

hai SE, Hong Kong Exchanges, TSX Group (including both the TSX and TSX Venture Exchange),
Deutsche Borse and Bombay SE.
46
Scott Hendry & Michael King, “The Efficiency of Canadian Capital Markets: Some Bank
of Canada Research” (Summer 2004) Bank of Canada Review 5, at 10.
47
Id., at 13.
48
Nicholls, supra, note 18, at 159. Of those 48 issuers, three-quarters were listed on the Alternative Investment Market (“AIM”), which is geared to smaller issuers and is therefore more
“flexibly regulated”.
49
Interlisted Symbols on the Toronto Stock Exchange, online: TSX <http://www.tmx.com/
en/pdf/Interlisted.txt> [hereinafter “TSX”]. This includes cross-listings with NASDAQ, New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), NYSE Alternext (TSX).
50
Stéphane Rousseau, “London Calling?: The Experience of the Alternative Investment
Market and the Competitiveness of Canadian Stock Exchanges” (2007) 23:1 B.F.L.R. 51, at 55.
51
Id., at 54.
52
Id.
53
TSX, supra, note 49.
54
Nicholls, supra, note 18, at 158-59, citing Office of International Corporate Finance, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Number of Foreign
Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission December
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While the data show that Canadian firms look to foreign markets,
Canada is not high on the list for cross listing by foreign issuers. As Professor Nicholls also points out:
Canada’s equity markets are neither a leading choice for cross-listing
by foreign issuers (as, for example, the London Stock Exchange is); nor
are they large enough to ensure that they will remain the primary
markets for the largest Canadian companies (as, for example, the New
55
York Stock Exchange is for most large U.S. issuers).

The data suggest that Canada can do better in attracting foreign issuers and maintaining the listings of domestic issuers. The financial crisis
of September 2008 underscored in a dramatic way the interconnectedness of global capital markets. This interconnectedness allows businesses
to raise capital where it is most easily available and least expensive.
Additionally, technology allows investors to search globally for the best
returns, either directly or through intermediaries such as pension funds.56
This global competition for capital will continue to intensify. This is the
environment in which Canadian issuers are competing for capital, from
both domestic and international investors. To remain competitive, Canada needs to address the inefficiencies associated with its regulatory
structure. Canada has to attract capital markets activity to remain competitive in both retaining and attracting investors and issuers.57

IV. DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
As noted in earlier parts of this paper, regulation and regulatory
structure have an impact on the quality of a jurisdiction’s capital market
and can impact the decisions of both investors and issuers on where to
invest and seek capital, respectively. Canada’s fragmented regulatory
structure, resulting in the Canadian discount, makes Canada less competitive on the global front.
Although Canadian capital markets are increasingly being affected
by international regulations and developments, and by competition from
31, 2004, online: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission <http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
internatl/foreignsummary2004.pdf>.
55
Id., at 136.
56
WPC, supra, note 2, at 1-2.
57
Eric Pan, Structural Reform of Financial Regulation in Canada (Ottawa: Expert Panel on
Securities Regulation, 2009), at 3-4 [hereinafter “Pan”].
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other jurisdictions, Canada’s already limited influence globally in capital
markets is declining partially due to constraints inherent in the Canadian
regulatory system.58 This part of the paper describes six trends in the
global and regulatory environment that further exacerbate the negative
impact of Canada’s fragmented regulatory structure.
1. Greater Regulatory Cooperation between Countries and IOSCO
Gains Prominence
As trade and financial markets have globalized, countries have been
increasingly interested in regulatory cooperation. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) was founded in 1983
to act as a cooperative regulatory body at a global level to mitigate systemic risk, enhance investor protection and strengthen information
exchange and cooperation in enforcement against misconduct.59 The G20
has encouraged IOSCO to continue its work on cross-border enforcement
cooperation.
Currently, because of our regulatory structure, Canada is the only
country that does not have a national voice at the IOSCO. Instead, Ontario and Quebec sit as “ordinary members” and Alberta and British
Columbia as “associate members”.60 This produces a spectacle of disproportion with Canada holding four seats yet only representing about 3 per
cent of global market capitalization, while the United States, which has
about 35 per cent of the global market capitalization, holds two seats, one
ordinary and one associate.61 Ironically, none of the four Canadian
“seats” has any authority to speak for Canada.
Canada is lacking a strong, consistent and authoritative voice at
IOSCO, as well as in negotiating cooperative initiatives such as with the
SEC and other leading capital markets jurisdictions.62
What other leading regulators think about the Canadian securities
regulatory system is important. For example, in 2008, the SEC started
negotiating a free trade in securities agreement with Australia but did not
do so with Canada, on the basis that our securities structure was too
58

Boissonneault, supra, note 29, at 56.
See IOSCO website for further details of its mandate, online: IOSCO <http://www.
iosco.org/about>.
60
See online: IOSCO <http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members.cfm?memID=1&order
By=jurSortName>.
61
WFE, supra, note 45. NYSE has 28.3 per cent of global market capitalization and
NASDAQ has 7.3 per cent.
62
Pan, supra, note 57, at 2.
59
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fragmented.63 If Canada is out of step with other leading jurisdictions, we
could be at a competitive disadvantage for reciprocal agreements such as
the MJDS and free trade agreements.
2. Regulatory Consolidation, Both Provincially and Internationally
Another important trend in the regulatory environment is regulatory
consolidation in the financial services sphere. This is taking place both
globally and also within Canada. This trend reflects the blurring of the
key elements of the financial sector — banks, trusts, insurance companies and securities dealers64 — and is also a recognition of the
interconnectedness of the financial system.65 Some commentators have
suggested that the asset backed commercial paper crisis in Canada could
have been better handled had we had greater consolidation in the financial regulation area.66
The Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) in the U.K. is a key example of a consolidated financial services regulator. The FSA has held
regulatory authority over all financial services providers in the U.K.
since December 2001. In November 2004, the FSA was given regulatory
power over mortgages, followed by power over general insurance activities in January 2005.67
Similarly, some of the Canadian provinces have also consolidated
provincial financial market regulation.68 On February 1, 2004, Quebec
launched its regulatory integration with the launch of the Autorité des
Marchés Financiers (“AMF”), which oversees the regulation of the financial sector, including insurance, securities, deposit-taking institutions

63

Canadian Bankers Association, “Enhancing Canadian Competitiveness by Reforming the
Way Securities are Regulated in Canada” (2008), at 5, submission to the Expert Panel on Securities
Regulation.
64
Boissonneault, supra, note 29, at 71.
65
See, for example, The Department of the Treasury, The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (Washington, D.C.: The Department of the
Treasury, 2008). See also Pan, supra, note 57.
66
See John Chant, The ABCP Crisis in Canada: The Implications for the Regulation of Financial Markets (Ottawa: Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, 2009).
67
See FSA website, online: FSA <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/History/
index.shtml>. However, this is changing as Britain’s finance minister, George Osborne, announced
on June 16, 2010 that he would split the FSA and reorganize it as two structures, one focusing on
prudential regulation and the other concentrating on supervising the way banks and brokers treat
customers and conduct business.
68
Boissonneault, supra, note 29, at 71.
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and the distribution of financial products and services.69 Saskatchewan is
also in the process of regulatory consolidation in the financial services
sector through Enterprise Saskatchewan.70
While other jurisdictions both globally and within Canada are actively considering regulation consolidation, Canada is lagging behind,
lacking consolidation even on the securities regulation front.
3. Expectations of Timely Regulatory Action
Technological advances have increased the speed and reach of capital markets activity. As such, another trend in the regulatory environment
is a focus on timely delivery of new legal rules and reform to existing
rules.
However, under the current system in Canada, it can take months or
even years to put in place a national or multilateral instrument through
the Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”) because whatever is
agreed to, if anything, must then be approved separately, by each individual province or territory. It generally takes at least 18 months to put a
national or multilateral rule in place, since 13 provinces/territories need
to come to agreement on the policy and the specific measures being
taken.71
Moreover, the current fragmented system makes it more difficult for
Canada to respond quickly to fast-moving developments. Two examples
illustrate well the delay experienced under the current system with the
CSA. The first example is the implementation of Canada’s response to
the U.S.’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act.72 SOX came into force as of July 2002,
while the Canadian measures came into effect almost two years later in
March 2004. The CSA gave priority to designing suitable measures for
the Canadian capital market but the result was a collection of five instruments and policies, only some of which were national and binding
69

See AMF website, online: AMF <http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/autorite/a-propos/mission.

en.html>.
70
See Enterprise Saskatchewan website, online: Enterprise Saskatchewan <http://www.
enterprisesaskatchewan.ca/plan/>. Enterprise Saskatchewan was created to promote and sustain
economic growth in the following sectors: Advanced Education and Research and Development Services, Agriculture and Food, Arts and Culture, Construction and Land Development, Co-operatives,
Energy, Environment, Financial Services, Forestry, Homebuilding, Information Technology, Life Sciences and Biotechnology, Manufacturing, Mining, Tourism, Trucking and Transportation.
71
Five Year Review Committee, Five Year Review Committee Final Report — Reviewing
the Securities Act (Ontario) (Toronto: Ministry of Finance, Ontario, 2003), at 76.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N, 116 Stat. 745
[hereinafter “SOX”].
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across the country as some jurisdictions refused to participate in the new
rules.73 Canada’s slow response to SOX and the much-publicized U.S.
accounting failures illustrates both the need for timely and coordinated
national responses to significant international events, and the difficulty
Canada currently has in implementing one.
The second example involves the delay in implementing the short
selling ban in Canada that resulted from the seemingly impending collapse of a number of U.S. banking institutions in 2008. While the FSA in
the U.K. and the SEC in the U.S. were able to immediately coordinate a
ban on short selling during the market meltdown on September 18,
2008,74 Canada could only belatedly follow 24 hours later, an eternity in
trading terms, because of the coordination that had to take place between
the Ontario Securities Commission (the lead regulator for the TSX) and
the other provincial/territorial regulators.75
Canada was heavily criticized for this 24-hour delay in responding as
trading was quite volatile, particularly for financial institutions’ stock. For
example, on September 18, Citigroup closed 18.7 per cent up over the previous day, American Express closed 14.2 per cent up, the Dow Jones
industrials average closed 3.9 per cent up, and S&P TSX composite closed
1.6 per cent up.76 The 24-hour delay could potentially have had significant
and negative consequences for a cross-listed financial institution.
4. Greater Consolidation of SROs and Quasi-Regulatory Bodies
The capital markets are comprised of many players including investors, issuers, intermediaries, stock exchanges and SROs. Other than the
securities commissions, which remain provincial, yet which have awkwardly tried to harmonize using the CSA, most of the other players of the
Canadian capital markets are national in scope.
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For example, the two main SROs in Canada, the IIROC and the
MFDA, are national in scope.77 Similarly, there has been significant consolidation and harmonization of the stock exchanges in Canada. Prior to
1999, Canada had five stock exchanges: the Vancouver Stock Exchange
(“VSX”), the Alberta Stock Exchange (“ASE”), the Winnipeg Stock Exchange (“WSE”), the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSE”, subsequently
“TSX”), and the Montreal Exchange (“ME”). Perhaps one of the most
obvious indicators of the national scope of capital markets is the 19992000 consolidation of the five regional stock exchanges into four national exchanges that are segmented by product type.78 The four national
exchanges currently are the TSX for senior equities, the TSX-V for junior equities, the Bourse de Montréal for derivatives trading and the
Winnipeg Commodity Exchange for commodity futures and options.79
5. Greater Accountability for Costs
As public institutions, regulators are accountable for the ways in
which they spend public funds. There are at least three areas of incremental cost associated with the current regulatory structure in Canada:
(1) cost of duplication in the regulatory structure; (2) increased compliance costs for issuers and intermediaries; and (3) opportunity costs for
issuers, intermediaries and investors resulting from missed opportunities.80 One study estimated that consolidating 13 regulators into a single
national regulator with one head office and five regional offices would
save 37 per cent of the total regulatory operating budget.81 Much of these
savings could be spent on substantive regulatory matters such as rulemaking, compliance and enforcement under a single national regulator.
6. Greater Expectations about Enforcement
Studies show that even the best-designed regulation must be enforced effectively if it is to optimally promote investor protection and

77
See WPC website for further details on SROs, online: WPC <http://www.wiseaverties.ca/main_en.html>.
78
See TMX History at a Glance, online: TMX Group <http://www.tmx.com/en/
pdf/TMXHistory.pdf>.
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Id., at 33-34.

622

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

investor confidence.82 Studies also show that investors and capital markets participants have high expectations about regulatory enforcement.83
There have been many critiques of Canada’s lax public enforcement
stance, particularly in comparison to the U.S.’s more stringent, backended approach to enforcement.
Some of the criticisms around enforcement include (1) the complexity and inefficient allocation of resources that the duplicative and
fragmented structure of the current enforcement system creates; (2) a
lack of enforcement action on high-profile cases; (3) delays between detection of misconduct and regulatory action; (4) delays in adjudication;
(5) lack of accountability at enforcement institutions; (6) lack of expertise and resources at the regulatory and criminal investigative level; and
(7) ineffective enforcement investigations at IMET.84
Some of these concerns would be addressed through the single national regulator, which proposes to (1) consolidate and harmonize both
regulatory and criminal enforcement in the same body; (2) provide
criminal investigators with additional investigative tools; (3) create an
independent hearing panel; and (4) establish simplified, consistent national standards for complaint handling and redress.85

V. CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to provide an empirical foundation from a
capital markets perspective evidencing the current need for a national
securities regulator in Canada. The intent of the foregoing empirical assessment has been to provide an empirical footing from which to ground
the constitutional discussion and debate.
By first exploring the relationship between Canada’s regulatory
structure and the strength, or lack thereof, of its capital markets, it is
clear that Canadian firms are suffering from a “Canadian discount” that
can be attributed, in part, to Canada’s inefficient securities regulatory
framework. The data also show that Canadian retail and institutional investors increasingly rely on the public capital markets to make
investments. Similarly, Canadian businesses are increasingly relying on
82
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public capital markets for their financing needs. The data also suggest
that global competition for capital compels a more proactive Canadian
response to remain competitive in attracting and retaining both issuers
and investors alike. Finally, the paper outlined six trends in the global
and regulatory environment that exacerbate the negative impacts of Canada’s fragmented regulatory structure, further underscoring the need for a
national regulator.
The lack of a Canadian securities regulator not only does a disservice
to investors and businesses, it puts Canada out of step with the rest of the
world, where the trend is towards consolidation of regulation. Indeed, as
has been pointed out, Canada remains the only major industrialized nation not to have a national securities regulator. In determining the
constitutionality of federal capital market regulation in Canada, it will
therefore be crucial to examine the underlying data, including the
changes in the global and Canadian capital markets, indicating the necessity of a national securities regulator at this time.

